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SECURING CRYPTO: EXEMPTING CERTAIN
CRYPTOASSETS FROM THE ARKANSAS
SECURITIES ACT
Jesse Kloss*

INTRODUCTION
Out of fifty states in 2019, Arkansas was ranked forty-fourth
for technology and innovation with a grade of “F,” thirty-sixth for
economy with a grade of “D+,” and thirty-seventh for business
friendliness with a grade of “D+.”1 It is time to make Arkansas
an innovation and business friendly state. Exempting certain fully
functional cryptoassets, those that have some purpose other than
a speculative or investment purpose, from the Arkansas Securities
Act is one step towards doing so.
This Comment suggests that the Arkansas legislature should
adopt an exemption from the Arkansas Securities Act for these
cryptoassets. Exempting these cryptoassets from state securities
laws would be a step towards establishing an innovation-friendly
regulatory environment in the State of Arkansas, and if the State
acts quickly, could make Arkansas a leading state in this area.2
This Comment will provide a brief background on cryptoassets3
for those new to the topic, including a survey of current
*
J.D. Candidate 2021, University of Arkansas School of Law. The author thanks Carol
Rose Goforth, Clayton N. Little Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law,
for her inspiration to research this topic and invaluable guidance in writing this Comment,
the Arkansas Law Review editorial board and staff editors for their indispensable editing
assistance, and her family for their unwavering support and encouragement.
1. Top States 2019: Overall Ranking, CNBC (July 10, 2019), [https://perma.cc/3YJFEHDG].
2. See infra Part III.B.
3. This Comment will refer to “cryptoassets,” a term intended to be broader than
“cryptocurrencies.” Cryptoassets are a digital asset class, defined as “digital assets in which
cryptographic techniques are used to regulate the generation of units of the asset and to verify
their transfer between parties via a blockchain without a central party,” and include more
than currency substitutes. Cryptocurrencies and Cryptoassets: Managing the New Asset
Class, EY, [https://perma.cc/H4UA-5RDJ] (last visited Sept. 9, 2020).
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cryptoassets, provide an overview of Arkansas securities
regulations, explain why most fully functional cryptoassets likely
constitute securities under the Arkansas Securities Act, and
survey recent legislation in other states exempting certain
cryptoassets from state securities laws. This Comment will then
argue that fully functional cryptoassets should be exempted to
create greater regulatory certainty and an innovation-friendly
regulatory environment to secure capital, jobs, and revenue for
the State of Arkansas.

I. WHAT ARE CRYPTOASSETS?
A. Coins versus Tokens
Cryptoassets are a digital asset class whereby “cryptographic
techniques are used to regulate the generation of units of the asset
and to verify their transfer between parties via a blockchain
without a central party.”4 There are thousands of different
cryptoassets on the market, over 5,300 as of April 2020.5
Cryptoassets are usually categorized as either coins or tokens.6
Coins are native to their own blockchain and often have features
that are similar to government backed money, or fiat currency.7
Digital coins may act as a currency, with no real function other
than serving as a way to transfer value, store value, or act as a unit
of account8 and operate “independently of other platforms.”9
Tokens, by contrast, are created on already existing
blockchains, and are often used within the “ecosystem” of a
particular project, such as those used within decentralized

4. Id.
5. All Cryptocurrencies, COINMARKETCAP, [https://perma.cc/6EHK-SA3N] (last
visited April 22, 2020).
6. See Stephen O’Neal, Differences Between Tokens, Coins and Virtual Currencies,
Explained, COINTELEGRAPH (July 29, 2019), [https://perma.cc/33JS-3WBM].
7. Id.
8. Laura M., Token vs Coin: What’s the Difference?, BITDEGREE (Sept.. 8, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/797D-QRJL].
9. Carol Goforth, The Lawyer’s Cryptionary: A Resource for Talking to Clients About
Crypto-transactions, 41 CAMPBELL L. REV. 47, 66 (2019) (citing Difference Between
Cryptocurrency Coins and Tokens, CRYPTONIAM (Dec. 5, 2017), [https://perma.cc/9A4WV77P]).
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applications, or “dApps.”10 DApps connect users directly and do
not require a middleman to function, as centralized apps like Uber
and Gmail do.11 Ethereum, a popular cryptoasset, allows
developers to run dApps on the Ethereum platform, and some
have dubbed Ethereum “the Mother of [dA]pps.”12 The Ethereum
white paper groups dApps into three primary categories: apps for
managing money, “apps where money is involved (but also
require[] another piece)”, and apps classified as “other,” such as
those involving “voting and governance systems.”13 Tokens
often give the holder the ability to participate in the network and
may be used for payment inside the ecosystem, represent shares,
or give the holder access to some aspect of the project.14

B. Bitcoin
A familiar digital coin is bitcoin. The Bitcoin white paper
was published in 2008 by the still anonymous Satoshi
Nakamoto.15 Bitcoin was launched as a peer-to-peer “electronic
cash” system based on a cryptographic proof designed to replace
professional financial institutions that serve as third-party
intermediaries between two transacting parties in conventional
transactions.16 Bitcoin differed from the earlier attempts at
creating digital currencies, such as Flooz, Beenz, and Digicash
which appeared in the 1990s,17 because Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer
network that uses a proof-of-work protocol,18 whereas earlier
10. O’Neal, supra note 6; Laura M., supra note 8.
11. What is a Decentralized Application?, COINDESK (July 23, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/TQ39-WDWA].
12. What Are Dapps? The New Decentralized Future, BLOCKGEEKS,
[https://perma.cc/2KKN-6ND3] (last visited Sept. 9, 2020).
13. COINDESK, supra note 11.
14. Bonpay, What Is the Difference Between Coins and Tokens?, MEDIUM (Mar. 13,
2018), [https://perma.cc/7QQM-4FF5].
15. SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM,
(2008), [https://perma.cc/3GUT-9PHB]; see also Marie Huillet, 11 Years Ago Today Satoshi
Nakamoto Published the Bitcoin White Paper, COINTELEGRAPH (Oct. 31, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/Q3YC-C88Z].
16. See NAKAMOTO, supra note 15.
17. What is Cryptocurrency. Guide for Beginners, COINTELEGRAPH,
[https://perma.cc/Q529-TYEU] (last visited Sept. 10, 2020).
18. Proof-of-work protocol is a consensus protocol used in a decentralized, peer-topeer network like Bitcoin and other early coins. Goforth, supra note 9, at 90.
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unsuccessful versions used the “Trusted Third Party approach.”19
The reason Bitcoin was considered innovative is that the Bitcoin
blockchain solved the “double spend” problem without relying on
a trusted third-party intermediary to verify transactions.20
The double-spend problem arises because without accurate
and trusted record keeping, the same amount can be spent twice
by the same holder.21 Bitcoin relied on an innovative “proof-ofwork” consensus protocol to resolve the double-spend issue
without third-party intermediaries by allowing participants in the
network to verify transactions using blockchain technology to
timestamp groups of transactions and broadcast them across the
network.22
A few terms must be defined in order to understand how this
transaction verification process works. Nodes are computers in
the network that relay information across the network.23 Some
nodes act as “miners,” which serve the important purpose of
generating and maintaining the history of bitcoin transactions by
solving complex “proof-of-work” math problems.24 Recent
transactions are compiled into blocks and at the end of each block
is a complicated math problem that miners work to solve.25 When
a miner solves the problem, the result is two-fold: the block of
validated transactions is added to the blockchain and the miner is
rewarded with bitcoin, which is the process by which new
bitcoins are generated.26
In addition to avoiding the problems of having to pay and
wait for an intermediary to act, Bitcoin also offers users a certain

19. COINTELEGRAPH, supra note 17. The Trusted Third-Party Approach means that
the security protocol is controlled by a third party. Nick Szabo, Trusted Third Parties are
Security Holes, SATOSHI NAKAMOTO INSTITUTE (2001), [https://perma.cc/7MUW-CAYA].
20. Harsh Agrawal, What is Double Spending & How Does Bitcoin Handle It?,
COINSUTRA (Nov. 6, 2019), [https://perma.cc/M8KA-HBQR].
21. Team InnerQuest Online, How Does a Blockchain Prevent Double-Spending of
Bitcoins?, MEDIUM (Aug. 25, 2018), [https://perma.cc/4MB9-76Q8].
22. COINTELEGRAPH, supra note 17; Andrew Tar, Proof-of-Work, Explained,
COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 17, 2018), [https://perma.cc/77TR-WX5T].
23. Alyssa Hertig, How Bitcoin Mining Works, COINDESK (July 8, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/95BZ-QU6K].
24. Id.; Nolan Bauerle, How Does Blockchain Technology Work?, COINDESK (July 19,
2017), [https://perma.cc/RHN6-36BX].
25. Goforth, supra note 9, at 89.
26. COINDESK, supra note 23.
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layer of privacy.27 While it is true that distributed ledger
technology requires that transactions must be public, public keys
are anonymous.28 This means that anyone can see that an amount
is being sent between two parties, but the actual identities of the
parties remain anonymous.29
However, while transacting with bitcoin may not result in
the purchaser’s name and physical address being made public,
their identity can still be determined using information like an IP
address.30 It is probably more accurate to say that bitcoin
transactions are pseudo-anonymous.31 Users wanting to remain
truly anonymous have a few options. One way is through a
process known as “Bitcoin mixing,” which tries to destroy
traceability by “creating temporary addresses or by swapping
coins with other addresses of the same value.”32 There are other
coins which offer greater privacy that will be discussed in the
privacy coin section of this Comment.

C. The Emergence of Altcoins
In determining whether cryptoassets are securities, it is
necessary to understand that there are various other cryptoassets
on the market besides bitcoin.33 Each of these cryptoassets are
distinguishable in a number of important ways.34 The first
cryptoassets that arose after bitcoin were known as “altcoins.”35
Altcoins can differ from bitcoin in many ways, such as by using
a different economic model, a different method for distributing
coins, a different mining algorithm, by offering “more versatile
programming language” so that applications can be built on the
27. See Protect Your Privacy, BITCOIN, [https://perma.cc/EAG2-G2SN] (last visited
Aug. 27, 2020).
28. NAKAMOTO, supra note 15, at 6.
29. Id.
30. Harsh Agrawal, 6 Ways To Make Untraceable Bitcoin Transactions, COINSUTRA
(Aug. 12, 2020), [https://perma.cc/5YL7-FZKA].
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Bernard Marr, A Short History of Bitcoin and Crypto Currency Everyone
Should Read, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2017), [https://perma.cc/RM2H-KYBE].
34. See
CryptoAsset
Classifications,
INTELLIGENT
TRADING
FOUND.,
[https://perma.cc/A7UD-J8BZ] (last visited Aug. 29, 2020).
35. Marr, supra note 33.
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blockchain, or by offering a greater level of privacy, among
others.36
These so-called “altcoins,” digital coins designed to serve as
alternatives to bitcoin, began to emerge in 2011.37 Altcoins
attempted to change and improve on some aspect of the process
used in bitcoin transactions, such as by offering increased speed
or greater anonymity for users.38 Some of the first rivals to
emerge were Namecoin and Litecoin.39
The Ethereum platform was created in 2015 and its native
currency is ether.40 Ether is marketed as “‘digital money’ that can
be sent over the internet instantly and cheaply.”41 Ether is
consistently the second most highly capitalized cryptoasset
behind bitcoin.42 Ethereum mining is similar to Bitcoin mining,
and “problems” are usually solved every twelve seconds,
broadcasting the block across the network for validation and
rewarding the successful problem solver with ether.43 Like
Bitcoin, Ethereum is not controlled by a “company or centralized
organization” and is instead “maintained and improved over time
by a diverse global community of contributors.”44 The Ethereum
platform is different from Bitcoin in that it allows developers to
build applications and technologies on top of its blockchain.45
The Ethereum platform allows for the trading of ether and it
uses blockchain-based smart contracts to facilitate these
transactions.46 A smart contract is a computer protocol that
digitally facilitates, verifies, or enforces transactions without the

36. What Is an Altcoin?, BITCOIN MAG., [https://perma.cc/CSK4-N8VK] (last visited
Aug. 29, 2020).
37. Marr, supra note 33.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See What Is Ether (ETH)?, ETHEREUM, [https://perma.cc/3AD3-8NTT] (last
visited Aug. 29, 2020).
41. How To Buy Ether (ETH), MYCRYPTO (July 1, 2020), [https://perma.cc/HX5JDMZB].
42. Top 100 Cryptocurrencies by Market Capitalization, COINMARKETCAP,
[https://perma.cc/RCY6-4QM2] (last visited Aug. 31, 2020).
43. Alyssa Hertig, How Ethereum Mining Works, COINDESK (July 13, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/9Y77-7Q7L].
44. Ethereum, FACEBOOK (June 30, 2020), [https://perma.cc/GGM8-SCDS].
45. COINDESK, supra note 11.
46. Marr, supra note 33.
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need for third parties.47 A smart contract completes transactions
with cryptographic code.48
The Arkansas legislature took the step to define a smart
contract in 2019,49 joining a number of other states that have taken
similar action.50 Arkansas law defines a smart contract as
“[b]usiness logic that runs on a blockchain; or” “[a] software
program that stores rules on a shared and replicated ledger and
uses the stored rules for:” “[n]egotiating the terms of a contract;”
“[a]utomatically verifying the contract;” “and [e]xecuting the
terms of a contract.”51 While it is positive that the Arkansas
legislature is looking into the crypto space, this bill received a
great deal of criticism from the blockchain community,
particularly for specifying that smart contracts are enforceable
commercial contracts.52
The XRP token is another well-known cryptoasset.53 XRP
is used to transfer value across the Ripple Network, and it acts as
a mediator for crypto and fiat currency exchanges.54 Ripple
markets itself as a global payments network that “enable[s]
financial institutions to send money across borders, instantly,
reliably and for fractions of a penny.”55 Ripple uses its own
unique patented technology, the Ripple protocol consensus
algorithm (RPCA), to facilitate transactions.56 Whether it is
appropriate to classify the XRP token as a cryptoasset is
controversial.57 Some have argued that Ripple is not a true
47. Ameer Rosic, Smart Contracts: The Blockchain Technology That Will Replace
Lawyers, BLOCKGEEKS, [https://perma.cc/D5WV-B5XZ] (last visited Sept. 11, 2020).
48. Alyssa Hertig, How Do Ethereum Smart Contracts Work?, COINDESK (July 13,
2020), [https://perma.cc/5BSF-DYNW].
49. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-32-122 (2019); H.B. 1944, 92d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ark. 2019).
50. Jonathan A. Beckham & Maria Sendra, Smart Contracts Lead the Way to
Blockchain
Implementation,
GREENBERG
TRAURIG
2
(Dec.
2,
2019),
[https://perma.cc/8JXX-76ET].
51. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-32-122; Ark. H.B. 1944.
52. See infra Part II.D.ii.
53. What Is Ripple. Everything You Need to Know, COINTELEGRAPH,
[https://perma.cc/ZLX8-GKVU] (last visited Sept. 2, 2020).
54. Id.
55. Our Company, RIPPLE, [https://perma.cc/74EJ-4VTW] (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
56. COINTELEGRAPH, supra note 53.
57. Joe Liebkind, Why Some Claim Ripple Isn’t a ‘Real’ Cryptocurrency,
INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 24, 2017), [https://perma.cc/YYC8-FE84].
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cryptoasset at all because it is not decentralized and is instead
controlled by one company.58
In fact, because of the central role the Ripple company plays
in the control and maintenance of the XRP tokens, plaintiffs in a
California class action have alleged that XRP tokens are securities
and Ripple violated state and federal securities laws by failing to
register XRP offerings with the State of California or the SEC.59
Supporting plaintiff’s proposition is the fact that Ripple has a
great deal of control over the flow of XRP because Ripple owns
the majority of XRP tokens and chooses when to release them
from its escrow service,60 and due to Ripple’s 2014
implementation of what is known as the “balance freeze”
feature.61 This feature allows Ripple to freeze or confiscate XRP
from any user, a feature apparently created to aid compliance with
regulatory actions such as a court-ordered confiscation of funds.62
Ripple’s motion to dismiss the case was denied on February 26,
2020, so it remains possible that XRP could be classified as a
security under state or federal law.63

D. Privacy Coins
Some cryptoassets are specifically designed to offer users
optimal privacy and anonymity.64 One such privacy coin is
monero.65 Monero markets itself as “electronic cash that allows
fast, inexpensive payments to and from anywhere in the world.”66
The Monero ledger allows users to send and receive transactions

58. Mix, Ripple (XRP) Is Centralized and Terribly Flawed, Researchers Say, HARD
FORK (Feb. 6, 2018), [https://perma.cc/YYF4-F57T].
59. Zakinov v. Ripple Labs, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 3d 950, 952 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
60. Stephen O’Neal, XRP Fork Unlikely to Succeed, Ripple Continues to Face Angry
Investors, COINTELEGRAPH (Sept. 15, 2019), [https://perma.cc/97KJ-K642].
61. The Ripple Story, BITMEX RESEARCH 6 (Feb. 6, 2018), [https://perma.cc/7GXXRQQL].
62. Id.
63. Zakinov v. Ripple Labs, Inc., No. 70, slip op. at *23 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2020).
64. Taylor Armerding, IMF Wants to Pierce the Blockchain Anonymity
Veil, SYNOPSYS (Apr. 3, 2018), [https://perma.cc/8MB7-2MWP].
65. Id.
66. What Is Monero (XMR)?, MONERO, [https://perma.cc/PE89-JRT6] (last visited
Apr. 22, 2020).
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and no one else can see the sender, amount, or the destination.67
It is virtually impossible to link monero to previous transactions
because sending and receiving addresses are hidden in every
Monero transaction.68
Zcash is another popular privacy coin.69 Zcash shields
addresses and balances from being visible on the blockchain.70
One difference between Monero and Zcash is that all Monero
transactions are private, whereas Zcash allows the user to choose
if their address or transaction is transparent.71 Zcash users choose
whether or not the sender and recipient are private or public.72
There are a number of additional differences between Monero and
Zcash regarding their underlying protocols, cryptography, and the
way each is mined73, but both are classified as privacy coins.74

E. Stablecoins
Stablecoins are cryptoassets that are tied to another fungible
asset, such as fiat currencies like the U.S. dollar, or other
established cryptoassets.75 Pegging a cryptoasset to another asset
is done for the purpose of stabilizing price volatility.76 Bitcoin is
not backed by any other currency, any government, or any other
asset, and its value is volatile as a result.77
67. Aaron Mangal, What Is Monero (XMR)? An In-Depth Guide to the Privacy Coin,
COINCENTRAL (Jan. 9, 2019), [https://perma.cc/H67P-W83N].
68. See MONERO, supra note 66.
69. Rajarshi Mitra, Zcash vs. Monero: Comparative Privacy Coin Guide,
BLOCKGEEKS, [https://perma.cc/FDR6-2JEH] (last visited Sept. 11, 2020).
70. The Basics, ZCASH, [https://perma.cc/FM7U-FDLA] (last visited April 22, 2020).
71. Id.; Mitra, supra note 69.
72. Mitra, supra note 69; ZCASH, supra note 70.
73. For more information regarding the technical differences between Zcash and
Monero, see Mitra, supra note 69.
74. See id.
75. Connor Blenkinsop, Stablecoins, Explained, COINTELEGRAPH, (Apr. 30, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/EQ5K-J684].
76. Id.
77. See COINMARKETCAP, supra note 5, for information on the value of bitcoin and
other cryptocurrencies over time. For a material example of just how volatile bitcoin prices
can be, look no further than the “Bitcoin pizza guy,” Laszlo Hanyecz, who infamously
purchased two Papa John’s pizzas for 10,000 Bitcoin in 2010. That 10,000 Bitcoin, which
was worth pennies in 2010, has been worth as much as eighty million dollars in recent years.
Molly Jane Zuckerman, Bitcoin Pizza Guy: Laszlo Hanyecz on Why Bitcoin Is Still the Only
Flavor of Crypto for Him, COINTELEGRAPH (May 27, 2018), [https://perma.cc/8G4D3Z9W].

640

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73:3

In many ways, stablecoins aim to be more like the U.S. dollar
or other fiat currencies.78 Stablecoins offer the aspects of crypto
that are popular, like transparency, security, speed, low fees, and
privacy, while offering the best aspect of traditional payments
methods, like trust and stability.79 There are many potential
benefits from adopting stablecoins. A secure digital currency
could make cross-border transactions cheaper and more efficient,
improve financial planning, and serve as a financial tool for the
underbanked.80
There are a few different ways to create a stablecoin peg. A
company itself could hold the collateral, which are known as
collateralized stablecoins.81 Another option is an algorithmic peg,
where a smart contract essentially acts as a central bank and alters
the amount of the stablecoin in circulation so that it is always
correctly pegged to the underlying asset.82
Tether is a popular stablecoin.83 Tether is marketed as
“traditional currency on the Blockchain.”84 Tether can be pegged
to U.S. dollars, euros, or Chinese yuans.85 Reeve Collins, CEO
of Tether, described Tether as “a dollar that works on the
blockchain.”86 The Tether website states that “[o]ne Tether
equals one underlying unit of the currency backing it, e.g., the
U.S. Dollar, and is backed 100% by actual assets in the Tether
platform’s reserve account.”87 Tether periodically publishes a
record of its reserve balances.88
A proposed stablecoin that has been in recent headlines is
libra, the proposed cryptoasset developed by the makers of

78. What Are Stablecoins?, CB INSIGHTS 1, [https://perma.cc/NXB8-7ZFX].
79. Id. at 2.
80. Id. at 3.
81. Ofir Beigel, The Complete Beginner’s Guide to Stablecoins, 99BITCOINS (May 4,
2020), [https://perma.cc/L84D-BV7M].
82. Id.
83. See Blenkinsop, supra note 75.
84. Why Use Tether?, TETHER, [https://perma.cc/224Y-29Y5] (last visited Aug. 28,
2020).
85. FAQs, TETHER, [https://perma.cc/GNU4-DSNJ] (last visited Aug. 28, 2020).
86. Pete Rizzo, Realcoin Rebrands as ‘Tether’ to Avoid Altcoin Association, COINDESK
(Nov. 20, 2014), [https://perma.cc/BS2Q-7AMX].
87. About Us, TETHER, [https://perma.cc/65P3-W3ML] (last visited Sept. 11, 2020).
88. Transparency, TETHER, [https://perma.cc/4FER-DKAQ] (last visited Sept. 11,
2020).
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Facebook.89 The original Libra White Paper published in June
2019 said that libra would be pegged to “a basket of global
currencies.”90 The white paper was updated in April 2020, now
stating that libra will be pegged to singular currencies rather than
“a basket of global currencies,” largely in response to concerns
that libra could affect monetary sovereignty and monetary
policy.91 The problem identified in the Libra White Paper is that
“1.7 billion adults globally remain outside of the financial system
with no access to a traditional bank” yet one billion people own
mobile phones and half a billion have access to the internet, which
Libra intends to solve by increasing financial inclusion.92
A difference between Libra and many other cryptoassets is
that Libra, as proposed, will not be decentralized in the same way
as other cryptoassets.93 The Libra Association is Libra’s
governing body, described as an independent, not-for-profit
organization responsible for “facilitate[ing] the operation of the
Libra payment system,” coordinating among stakeholders, and
managing the Libra Reserve.94 The Libra Association is made up
of many prominent organizations from various industries,
including the aforementioned Facebook, which is primarily
responsible for generating the project, as well as Lyft, Spotify,
Uber, Coinbase, Mercy Corps, and others.95

89. Kari Paul, Libra: Facebook Launches Cryptocurrency in Bid to Shake up Global
Finance, THE GUARDIAN (June 18, 2019), [https://perma.cc/4WN5-GAMY].
90. Richard Meyer, Facebook Reveals Libra Crypto’s Currency Basket Breakdown:
Report, COINDESK (Sept. 23, 2019), [https://perma.cc/VLJ7-FFMZ]; White Paper, LIBRA
ASS’N 1 (Apr. 2020), [https://perma.cc/L6E5-T33G].
91. LIBRA ASS’N, supra note 90, at 1-2.
92. Id. at 4.
93. See id. at 24.
94. Id.
95. The Libra Association, LIBRA, [https://perma.cc/79D8-R2L2] (last visited Sept. 1,
2020). However, eBay, Mastercard, Visa, and PayPal, among others, have withdrawn from
the Libra project due in part to scrutiny from government regulators. Lauren Feiner,
Facebook’s Libra Cryptocurrency Coalition Is Falling Apart as eBay, Visa, Mastercard and
Stripe Jump Ship, CNBC (Oct. 13, 2019), [https://perma.cc/5N7W-62NR].

642

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73:3

F. Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) and Security Token
Offerings: A Distinction with Little Difference
An Initial Coin Offering (ICO) is a way for a company
marketing a new cryptoasset to raise capital from investors, and
the new crypto is usually purchased with fiat money or other
existing cryptoassets.96 J.R. Willett is accredited with holding
one of the first ICOs, which was for Mastercoin.97 Willett
presented the concept of an ICO as:
a bunch of trustworthy guys . . . that people have heard of
[who] say, okay, we’re going to do this. We’re going to
make a new protocol layer. It’s going to have new features
X, Y and Z on top of bitcoin, and here’s who we are and
here’s our plan, and here’s our bitcoin address, and anybody
who sends coins to this address owns a piece of our new
protocol.98

In 2013, the Mastercoin ICO raised 5,000 bitcoin, a value of
$500,000 at the time.99
ICOs are a fundraising mechanism and a way to attract
investors to a new crypto project.100 The way that ICOs often
work is that a company will submit a white paper describing the
new crypto project and the problem that it is seeking to solve and
readers can then decide to invest in the project.101 When someone
invests money in an ICO, they are often providing money for the
completion of the project, so it is perhaps more accurate to think
of ICOs as an opportunity to invest in the idea of a project rather
than investing in the project itself, at least in situations where
funds raised go towards project completion.102 Frequently, the

96. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd. v. Alibabacoin Found., No. 18-CV-2897 (JPO), 2018
WL 2022626, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. April 30, 2018).
97. Chris Abraham, The Origin Story of the Initial Coin Offering (ICO) Token Sale
History, NEWCONOMY (Oct. 13, 2018), [https://perma.cc/BW7E-TS3U].
98. Id.
99. Howard Marks, The ICO Is Dead. Long Live the ICO 2.0, HACKERNOON (Feb. 21,
2018), [https://perma.cc/2QPQ-UMN9].
100. Ameer Rosic, What Is An Initial Coin Offering? Raising Millions in Seconds,
BLOCKGEEKS, [https://perma.cc/A9M2-884M] (last visited Sept. 11, 2020).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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new cryptoassets offered in an ICO are issued for either bitcoin
or ether.103
ICO’s became popular in 2017, a year in which $5.6 billion
was raised, catapulting into 2018, where $7 billion was raised in
the first quarter alone.104 ICO popularity took a strong downward
tick starting in June 2018.105 There are a few explanations for
why ICO popularity has declined. The first reason is the inherent
risks involved in investing in an ICO, which some have called
“the new Digital Wild West.”106 One study found that more than
eighty percent of ICOs conducted in 2017 were scams.107 It is
pretty simple to create a fraudulent ICO: come up with a fake but
conceivable proposal or omit key facts making the proposal seem
important and intricate, when in actuality it is not.108
Why would someone invest in such a seemingly risky
venture? The potential gain is enormous if the coin turns out to
be successful.109 If the coin operates as promised or the value of
the coin increases, early purchasers can make significant gains.110
During the Ethereum ICO, one ether traded for forty to fifty
cents.111 Ether traded for as much as $1,417.38 in 2018, achieving
a 13,000% increase in value in that year alone.112
Another explanation for the decreasing popularity of ICOs,
the most relevant to the scope of this Comment, is the regulatory
concerns with ICOs.113 Perhaps the phrase Initial Coin Offering
(ICO) sounds familiar. ICOs are both phonetically and
conceptually similar to an Initial Public Offering (IPO), whereby
a company sells shares of capital stock to the general public for
103. What Is An ICO?, BITCOIN MAG., [https://perma.cc/4MWW-8R49] (last visited
Sept. 11, 2020).
104. The State of the Token Market 9 Months into 2018, FABRIC VENTURES 8,
[https://perma.cc/9WF5-5A6W] (last visited Sept. 11, 2020).
105. Id.
106. Randolph A. Robinson II, The New Digital Wild West: Regulating the Explosion
of Initial Coin Offerings, 85 TENN. L. REV. 897, 898 (2018).
107. Ana Alexandre, New Study Says 80 Percent of ICOs Conducted in 2017 Were
Scams, COINTELEGRAPH (July 13, 2018), [https://perma.cc/LG5Y-AGTD].
108. Rosic, supra note 100.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Arjun Kharpal, Ethereum Hits a Fresh Record High and Is Up Over 13,000% in
a Year, CNBC (Jan. 10, 2018), [https://perma.cc/YX32-JNZR].
113. Robinson II, supra note 106, at 898, 955-56, 960.
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the first time.114 IPOs are securities offerings registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).115
The SEC has suggested that ICOs often constitute securities
offerings, regardless of whether the token or coin itself would
constitute a security once it is fully functional.116 This is because
with many ICO investors are providing money for the completion
of the project in which offerors continue to play an active role.117
The SAFT, or Simple Agreement for Future Tokens, Project was
a proposal for creating a token sale compliant with securities
laws.118 While the SAFT Project focuses on the federal securities
laws and the investment contract test from the United Stated
Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Company,119 its distinction
between pre-functional and functional tokens is pertinent to this
Comment:
Unlike a pre-functional token . . . whose market value is
determined predominantly by the efforts of the sellers in
imbuing the tokens with functionality, a genuinely
functional token’s value is determined by a variety of market
factors, the aggregate impact of which likely predominates
the “efforts of others.” Sellers of already-functional tokens
have likely already expended the “essential” managerial
efforts that might otherwise satisfy the Howey test.120

To reiterate the point, even if the token offered would not be
considered a security once it is functional, it can be and probably
is a security when offered through an ICO, because most ICOs
sell pre-functional tokens, or contractual rights to acquire the
tokens when they are functional, rather than the actual tokens
themselves.121 ICOs of this sort should be registered with
114. BITCOIN MAG., supra note 103; Investor Bulletin: Investing in an IPO, SEC, OFF.
OF INV. EDUC. AND ADVOC. 1, [https://perma.cc/FMP4-UCUE] (last visited Aug. 23, 2020).
115. SEC, supra note 114, at 1.
116. See JUAN BATIZ-BENET ET AL., THE SAFT PROJECT: TOWARD A COMPLIANT
TOKEN SALE FRAMEWORK 11 (2017), [https://perma.cc/EQA9-UXVT]; Spotlight on Initial
Coin Offerings (ICOs), SEC (Jan. 7, 2020), [https://perma.cc/CCK9-2R52].
117. See BATIZ-BENET ET AL., supra note 116, at 11.
118. Id. at 15.
119. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
120. Id. at 1-2.
121. See James J. Park, When Are Tokens Securities? Some Questions from the
Perplexed, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 20, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/XN4C-DBY3].
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securities regulators and investors need the protection of the
securities laws in this space.122 While this Comment will not
focus on how the SEC has regulated cryptoassets and ICOs to
date, it is important to understand that the SEC certainly has ICOs
on its radar and has found that most ICOs are securities
offerings.123
Tokenized securities, or security tokens, are cryptoassets
that are specifically designed to function like traditional
securities.124 Security tokens represent interests in a business
venture and may provide certain rights to investors, including
equity, the right to receive dividends, profit-sharing rights, voting
rights, etc.125 Security tokens may be offered through Security
Token Offerings (STOs), which are either registered with the
relevant securities regulators or structured to comply with an
exemption; they are generally understood to be securities by the
transacting parties.126 The label STO is not universally used, with
some such offerings still being referred to as ICOs, but in the case
of tokenized securities, the term is understood to refer to a legally
compliant, licensed distribution, registered with or exempt from
registration by the appropriate securities regulators.127 Security
tokens and offerings of security tokens are understood to fit
within the current securities laws to the blockchain industry and
generally minimize investor risk as compared to noncompliant
ICOs.128
Many think STOs could serve as the bridge between
traditional finance and the blockchain world.129 While some
token creators will want to avoid being classified as securities,
there are benefits to being regulated in certain circumstances,
such as with security tokens, because they offer investors a
122. See id.
123. For more information on how the SEC has regulated crypto, see SEC, supra note
114.
124. David Petersson, What Are Tokenized Securities and Why They Matter, FORBES
(Mar. 27, 2019), [https://perma.cc/H7XH-GM5M].
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Tim Fries, STOs v. ICOs: What’s the Difference?, THE TOKENIST (Sept. 15,
2019), [https://perma.cc/9AMT-HN2X].
128. Id.
129. Id.
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greater level of security, as the “security token” label aptly
implies.130 Legally compliant offerings of security tokens should
be encouraged and allowed to flourish. This is a promising way
the traditional financial system is adopting this innovative
technology.
This Comment will not argue that security tokens should be
exempted from the Arkansas Securities Act because they are
intended to be securities, gain legitimacy from regulation, and it
would not be in the State’s or the transacting parties’ interests to
exempt tokenized securities from state securities laws.131 This
Comment suggests that fully functional cryptoassets other than
tokenized securities should be exempted from Arkansas securities
laws to ensure that Arkansas is a pro-innovation, pro-technology,
and pro-business state.

G. Utility Tokens versus Security Tokens
Some cryptoassets have no function other than serving as a
substitute for currency, conventional debt, or equity securities, or
they derive their value from an external, tradable asset.132 These
are the kind of tokens that are most often agreed to be subject to
securities laws.133 Some sources lump all of these into the
category of “security token,” meaning only these tokens should
be regulated as securities.134 Note that tokenized securities, as
that phrase is used in this Comment, are one kind of security
token, but other kinds of crypto may also be security tokens.135
The lack of precision in this particular label is one reason that this
Comment does not use it.
Lawmakers and writers in the crypto space often have a
special category for tokens that are not seen as being within the
130. Complete Guide to Security Tokens: How They Work Explained Simply, THE
TOKENIST, [https://perma.cc/9M3C-AC6H] (last visited Aug. 24, 2020).
131. See id; Fries, supra note 127.
132. Toshendra Kumar Sharma, Security Tokens vs. Utility Tokens: A Concise Guide,
BLOCKCHAIN COUNCIL (Sept. 6, 2019), [https://perma.cc/VZ8S-LJSD]; Katalyse.io,
Security Tokens vs. Utility Tokens - How Different Are They?, HACKERNOON (Sept. 25,
2018), [https://perma.cc/D7BN-2LMT].
133. Sharma, supra note 132.
134. See Rajarshi Mitra, Utility Tokens vs Security Tokens: Learn the Difference Ultimate Guide, BLOCKGEEKS, [https://perma.cc/3JSQ-ZUKE] (last visited Sept. 12, 2020).
135. See id.
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scope of traditional securities laws; these are often referred to as
functional utility tokens.136 These utility tokens, often associated
with smart contracts and dApps, have some inherent utility or
functionality other than acting as a currency substitute or
speculative investment.137 Utility tokens have been defined as
“entity-specific crypto-assets that have some utility within the
software application or platform being developed.”138 There are
a number of functions which could constitute “utility,” including
giving users access to the underlying blockchain, access to digital
goods, access to a specific good or service, digital representation
of a different financial asset (stablecoins), or fundraising.139
Utility tokens may allow users to pay for specific services like
cloud storage or access to an internet browser with no
advertisements.140 Utility tokens are not created to function like
investments.141
When it comes to how the securities regulators determine if
a token is a security, the federal court’s approach is governed by
the Howey investment contract test, and it should be clear that the
SEC and the courts will not assume a token is outside of the
securities laws just because it is labeled as a utility token.142
However, there are some useful analogies from the Howey case
for understanding utility tokens.
In Howey, the W.J. Howey Company and Howey-in-theHills Service, Inc. were Florida corporations that offered
prospective customers land-sales contracts and service contracts
136. See, e.g., Sharma, supra note 132; Nate Crosser, Initial Coin Offerings as
Investment Contracts: Are Blockchain Utility Tokens Securities?, 67 UNIV. KAN. L. REV.
379, 392-94 (2018); Mitra, supra note 134; Rachel Wolfson, U.S. State Of Wyoming Defines
Cryptocurrency ‘Utility Tokens’ As New Asset Class, FORBES (Mar. 13, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/XYN9-RZSS].
137. Laura M., supra note 8.
138. Robinson II, supra note 106; see also Laura Shin, Are ICOs for Utility Tokens
Selling Securities? Prominent Crypto Players Say Yes, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/Q834-P5UZ].
139. What Are Utility Tokens, and How Will They Be Regulated?, SFOX (Dec. 29,
2018), [https://perma.cc/ST7R-UD3E].
140. Park, supra note 121.
141. Katalyse.io, supra note 132.
142. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); “ICOs, or more specifically tokens,
can be called a variety of names, but merely calling a token a ‘utility’ token or structuring it
to provide some utility does not prevent the token from being a security.” SEC, supra note
114.
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for citrus acreage.143 The Court handed down the famous Howey
test to determine if an arrangement is an investment contract: an
investment contract exists when a person invests money in a
common enterprise and expects profits solely from the efforts of
a third party.144
It is common sense that while the Howey contracts were
securities under this investment contract test, the Court never held
that the tangible oranges themselves constituted securities.145 In
the crypto context, pre-functional tokens146 offered through ICOs,
where money given is used to fund the completion of the project,
likely constitute a security offering, but the functional token itself,
once completed, is not necessarily a security by virtue of the fact
that the ICO constituted a security offering.147
However, this Comment does not argue for solely using the
utility token versus security token distinction because the labels
are so often arbitrarily applied.148 A token could have some
“utility” and nonetheless be considered a security under federal
or state law.149 A pre-functional utility token offered through an
ICO is almost certainly a security offering, even though the
underlying token might qualify as a “utility token” upon
completion.150 To address this, this Comment instead argues for
distinguishing based on functionality for offering exemptions
from state securities laws. Once a cryptoasset is functional, it
would qualify for an exemption, so long as it is not explicitly
marketed on the basis of speculation in value.

143. Howey, 328 U.S. at 294-95.
144. Id. at 298-99.
145. Scott Kupor & Sonal Chokshi, Analogies, the Big Picture, and Considerations for
Regulating Crypto, ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ (May 4, 2018), [https://perma.cc/LY7FZ9R6].
146. Pre-functional tokens are tokens which do not, at present, have a consumptive
use. They are not functional in the way that they will be once the project is complete. See
BATIZ-BENET ET AL., supra note 116, at 11. This distinction between pre-functional and
functional tokens matters for the application of the securities laws. “I think almost all prefunctional tokens result in a security per U.S. law,” said Marco Santori, a prominent lawyer
in the blockchain space. Shin, supra note 138.
147. See BATIZ-BENET ET AL., supra note 116, at 1-2, 9-12; Shin, supra note 138.
148. See supra Part I.G.
149. SEC, supra note 114.
150. See Shin, supra note 138.
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II. ARKANSAS SECURITIES LAWS AND CRYPTO
A. The Arkansas Securities Act
Under the Arkansas Securities Act (“the Act”), there is a
long list of arrangements that constitute a security, but the one
that matters for the purpose of this Comment is an investment
contract.151 It is unlawful, and a Class D felony in Arkansas, to
knowingly offer or sell unregistered and nonexempt securities.152
It is a Class A misdemeanor to negligently offer or sell
unregistered and nonexempt securities.153 There are also civil
penalties involved with the sale of unregistered and nonexempt
securities and a buyer of an unregistered and nonexempt security
may recover costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, plus the
consideration paid for the security and six percent interest per
year from the date of payment, minus income received from
owning the security or damages from the issuer or offeror.154
Registration of securities in Arkansas requires that numerous
documents be filed with the Arkansas Securities Department,
along with various fees.155
If a cryptoasset meets the definition of an investment
contract it is subject to the securities laws and any sale must be
registered or exempt.156
Registration is expensive and
151. Under the Arkansas Securities Act, a security is:
any: (i) [n]ote; (ii) [s]tock; (iii) [t]reasury stock; (iv) [b]ond; (v) [d]ebenture;
(vi) [e]vidence of indebtedness; (vii) [c]ertificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement; (viii) [c]ollateral-trust certificate; (ix)
[p]reorganization certificate or subscription; (x) [t]ransferable share; (xi)
[i]nvestment contract; (xii) [v]ariable annuity contract; (xiii) [l]ife settlement
contract or fractionalized or pooled interest in a life settlement contract; (xiv)
[v]oting-trust certificate; (xv) [c]ertificate of deposit for a security; (xvi)
[c]ertificate of interest or participation in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease or
in payments out of production under such a title or lease; or (xvii) [i]n general,
any interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘security’ or any certificate
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, guarantee
of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-42-102 (17)(A) (2019).
152. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-42-104(b) (1997).
153. ARK. CODE ANN § 23-42-104(c).
154. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-42-106(a) (2017).
155. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-42-403 to -404 (2011 & 2019) for more information
on Arkansas securities registration requirements.
156. See Mitra, supra note 134.
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burdensome and there are a limited number of exemptions.157
The only presently available alternative is to argue that the
cryptoassets in question are not investment contracts, which may
be very difficult to do successfully.158
The SEC and federal courts use the Howey test for
investment contracts,159 which includes any:
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it
being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are
evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in
the physical assets employed in the enterprise.160

Arkansas, however, follows a different approach.

B. Arkansas’s Risk Capital Test
Arkansas courts have taken a more expansive approach to
defining an investment contract than the Howey test.161 In Schultz
v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., the Arkansas Supreme Court cited
the Hawaii and Minnesota approaches to defining an investment
contract.162 Their approach for determining when an investment
contract exists is known as the “risk capital” test. 163 Hawaii holds
that an investment contract exists when:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of
the enterprise, and
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the
offeror’s promises or representations which give rise to a
reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit of some
kind, over and above the initial value, will accrue to the
offeree as a result of the operation of the enterprise, and
157. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-42-403 to -404.
158. See infra Part II.B.
159. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
160. Id.
161. Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769, 777-78, 552 S.W.2d 4, 8-9
(1977).
162. Id. at 779-80, 552 S.W.2d at 9-10.
163. Carol R. Goforth, Treatment of LLC Membership Interests Under the Arkansas
Securities Act, 1998 ARK. L. NOTES 33, 34-35.
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(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical
and actual control over the managerial decisions of the
enterprise.164

In Schultz, the Arkansas Supreme Court explained that the
definition of an investment contract “should be flexible enough to
encompass the endless succession of new and innovative or old
and tried promotional schemes, where the promoters, by design,
seek to risk the money or property of others in their venture.”165
The Arkansas Supreme Court also cited the Minnesota
Supreme Court, which had previously recognized that the Howey
test is not the only approach for defining an investment
contract.166 The Minnesota Supreme Court found the Howey test
to be both “rigid” and “definitive,” and acknowledged that while
it “is useful in identifying most ‘investment contracts,’” the court
decided that the Howey test should not be the exclusive test for
identifying an investment contract in Minnesota.167 According to
the Minnesota court, in a case that preceded the Securities Act of
1933 by thirteen years, the securities laws are a necessary exercise
of the state’s police powers and should be given a broad
construction, “for it was the evident purpose of the Legislature to
bring within the statute the sale of all securities not specifically
exempted[,]” and “[i]t is better to determine in each instance
whether a security is in fact of such a character as fairly to fall
within the scope of the statute.”168
The Arkansas Supreme Court cited this view of the
Minnesota Supreme Court approvingly, finding that the definition
of a security under the Arkansas Securities Act should not be
construed narrowly; rather “ it is better to determine in each
instance from a review of all of the facts, whether an investment
scheme or plan constitutes an investment contract, or a certificate
of interest or participation in a profit-sharing agreement, within
the scope of the statute.”169

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

State v. Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw. 1971).
Schultz, 261 Ark. at 777, 552 S.W.2d at 8.
State v. Invs. Sec. Corp., 209 N.W.2d 405, 410 (Minn. 1973).
Id.
State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937, 938 (Minn. 1920).
Schultz, 261 Ark. at 781, 552 S.W.2d at 10.
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The relevant facts in Schultz were as follows: the putative
investment contracts were partnership interests in a joint venture
organized by the sellers to construct an apartment complex, and
it was to be a tax shelter for those who supplied the equity for the
project.170 The court found that the interests in the joint venture
were securities under the Arkansas Securities Act.171
The venture was merely a tax shelter for the investors; they
performed no management duties and had virtually no
responsibilities in the operations of the venture.172 The
“[i]nvestors were mere passive contributors of risk capital who
placed their money in an investment program” and risked its loss
in the venture.173 The takeaway from Schultz is that in Arkansas,
a passive investment with hopes of realizing capital gains will
constitute a security under the Arkansas Securities Act, because
“regardless of labels, the Arkansas Securities Act was designed
to protect both investors in common stock and those persons who
in substance are the investors in the disguised business venture of
another.”174
Ten years later, in Casali v. Schultz, the Arkansas Supreme
Court answered a similar question regarding whether the sale of
a unit in a partnership interest constituted a security.175 The sale
worked as follows: a group of investors, including the appellees,
contributed capital into a partnership to purchase an investment
banking house.176 The sale of the partnership units constituted a
security under Arkansas law because the partnership units were,
again, a passive investment: the investors could not hire or fire
employees, set salaries, mortgage property, open bank accounts,
sign checks, incur any debts, sell any assets, or say how the stock
would be voted.177 Like the Schultz case, the investors in Casali
had no management authority in the business, but contributed
capital that was subject to the risks of the venture.178
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 772, 552 S.W.2d at 6.
Id. at 781, 552 S.W.2d at 10-11.
Id. at 782-83, 552 S.W.2d at 11.
Id. at 782, 552 S.W.2d at 11.
Schultz, 261 Ark. at 777, 552 S.W.2d at 8.
Casali v. Schultz, 292 Ark. 602, 603, 732 S.W.2d 836, 836 (1987).
Id.
Id. at 604, 732 S.W.2d at 837.
Id.; Schultz, 261 Ark. at 782, 552 S.W.2d at 11.
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The court used the risk capital test from Schultz, finding that
it did not matter that the arrangement was labeled a general
partnership interest, but rather the court looked to the “underlying
economic substance,” or “economic reality,” of the arrangement
to determine if it was a security.179 Whether or not a particular
arrangement is a security in Arkansas is a “flexible concept” that
“should be liberally construed to afford protection to the
public.”180
The Arkansas Court of Appeals has used a slightly varied
approach to defining an investment contract. In Smith v.
Arkansas, the court adopted a five-part test to determine whether
a particular purchase constituted an investment contract.181
Under this test, for a transaction to constitute an investment
contract, there must be:
(1) the investment of money or money’s worth;
(2) investment in a venture;
(3) the expectation of some benefit to the investor as a result
of the investment;
(4) contribution towards the risk capital of the venture; and
(5) the absence of direct control over the investment or
policy decisions concerning the venture.182

While the verbiage is different, the Arkansas Supreme Court,
as well as the Eighth Circuit, has found that the Smith test is
“substantially similar” to the Howey test the federal courts use.183
The issue then, is whether the Schultz approach and the Smith
approach are used independently of one other and, if so, when?
The Arkansas Supreme Court has shed some light on this
issue in subsequent cases. In Cook v. Wills, the court cited the
Smith five-factor test, but also cited Schultz for the proposition
179. Casali, 292 Ark. at 605-06, 732 S.W.2d at 837-38.
180. Id. at 605, 732 S.W.2d at 837.
181. Smith v. State, 266 Ark. 861, 865, 587 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Ct. App. 1979). This test
was attributed to a law review article written by Professor Joseph Long. Id at 864-65; 587
S.W.2d 50, 52; Joseph C. Long, An Attempt to Return “Investment Contracts” to the
Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 174 (1971).
182. Smith, 266 Ark. at 865, 587 S.W.2d at 52.
183. Union Nat’l Bank of Little Rock v. Farmers Bank, 786 F.2d 881, 885 (8th Cir.
1986); Grand Prairie Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Worthen Bank & Tr. Co., 298 Ark. 542, 545, 769
S.W.2d 20, 22 (1989).
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that “the definition of what constitutes a security must necessarily
depend on an analysis of all of the factors in any given
transaction.”184 The court did not go into much detail about the
different analyses in the Smith versus Schultz approach, finding
that since the plaintiffs provided skill and expertise to the business
venture, it could “hardly be categorized as a lack of control” and
was enough for the interest not to constitute a security.185
A similar result in Carder v. Burrow: the court recognized
the flexible and broad approach to defining an investment
contract under Schultz, concluding that the transaction at issue
“was an ordinary secured commercial loan” rather than the sale
of a security since there was no expectation of “profit.”186 The
court seems to take “benefit” to mean “profit,” whereas it is
plausible, particularly in the crypto context, that a purchaser may
receive a “benefit” that would not necessarily be considered a
“profit.”187 “Pursuant to the Smith factors, investors must expect
some ‘benefit,’ or profit, from the transaction.”188 A benefit could
be construed as being broader than a profit, so as benefit has been
interpreted to be synonymous with profit, the Smith test is
narrower than the all-inclusive Schultz approach.
The most recent case examining the Smith/Schultz
approaches to defining an investment contract is Waters v.
Millsap.189 In Waters, the Arkansas Securities Commissioner
argued that the Smith test is not the exclusive test for determining
if a transaction is a security under Arkansas law, and instead
asked the court to adopt the “Family Resemblance Test” that the

184.
185.
186.
187.

Cook v. Wills, 305 Ark. 442, 447, 808 S.W.2d 758, 761 (1991).
Id.
Carder v. Burrow, 327 Ark. 545, 550-51, 940 S.W.2d 429, 432 (1997).
Id. at 549-50, 940 S.W.2d at 431.

Pursuant to the Smith factors, investors must expect some ‘benefit,’ or profit,
from the transaction. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals . . . examined the
Arkansas Securities Act and determined that a fixed rate of interest payable at
fixed times did not constitute the ‘expectation of benefit’ needed to make a
note a security because it did not give the holder ‘an opportunity for either
capital appreciation or participation in the earnings’ of the company.
Id. (citing First Fin. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. E.F. Hutton Mortg. Corp., 834 F.2d 685, 689
(8th Cir. 1987)).
188. Id. at 549, 940 S.W.2d at 431.
189. Waters v. Millsap, 2015 Ark. 272, 465 S.W.3d 851 (2015).
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U.S. Supreme Court has adopted.190 The Arkansas Supreme
Court declined to adopt the Family Resemblance Test because it
was unnecessary to do so: the Family Resemblance Test factors
are encompassed within the “flexible, all-inclusive Schultz
test.”191
The court deemed the Smith factors “instructive” but never
to be relied on exclusively, instead citing the Schultz case to stand
for the proposition that a review of all the facts is required to
determine if an instrument is a security.192 The case was
remanded on the grounds that the lower court had only considered
the Smith factors without taking into account Schultz and factors
such as the sophistication of the parties to the transaction.193
While the Smith factors are instructive, the court found “that the
all-inclusive nature of the Schultz test is better suited to the
purposes of the [Arkansas Securities] Act.”194

C. Many Functional Cryptoassets are Likely Securities
Under Arkansas Law
Under Arkansas case law, both with the line of cases using
the risk capital test as well as Professor Long’s five-part test, it is
likely that most cryptoassets will be treated as securities
regardless of whether they are pre-functional or fully
functional.195 The Arkansas courts use a broader definition of an
investment contract than used by federal courts under Howey.196
Though the arrangements in Schultz and Casali would most likely
have been securities under the Howey test as well, the court
specifically noted the definition of a security needed to be
190. Id. at 2, 465 S.W.3d at 852. Under the Second Circuit’s “‘family resemblance’
test,” an issuer can “rebut the presumption that a note is a security if it can show that the note
in question ‘bears a strong family resemblance’ to an item on the . . . list of exceptions, . . .
or convinces the court to add a new instrument to the list.” Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494
U.S. 56, 64 (1990) (first citing Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d
1126, 1137 (2d Cir. 1976); and then citing Chem. Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d
930, 939 (2d Cir. 1984)) (alterations adopted).
191. Waters, 2015 Ark. at 13, 465 S.W.3d at 858.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 13, 465 S.W.3d at 858-59.
194. Id. at 13, 465 S.W.3d at 858.
195. See supra Part II.B.
196. See infra Part II.B.
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“flexible,” “liberally construed,” and broad “enough to
encompass the endless succession of new and innovative . . .
promotional schemes.”197 The risk capital test requires neither
commonality, an expectation of profits, nor that profits be solely
derived from the efforts of others, so many more cryptoassets will
be regulated under securities laws in jurisdictions like Arkansas
using the risk capital test than those using the Howey test.198
The first prong of the risk capital test is that the offeree must
furnish some initial value to an offeror.199 The purchaser of a
cryptoasset generally furnishes some value to the offeror in order
to receive the cryptoasset, whether it be in the form of fiat
currency or another cryptoasset.200
There is a notable situation where this would not be the case:
airdrops. Airdrops occur when a crypto company distributes its
tokens to certain user wallets for free.201 Airdrops are done to
generate awareness and create buzz around a new crypto
project.202 Since the offerees receive the tokens free of charge,
they have yet to furnish any value to the offeror and thus this
would fail the first prong of the risk capital test.
The second prong of the risk capital test requires that “a
portion of this initial value” be “subjected to the risks of the
enterprise.”203 In the case of an ICO, tokens are generally sold
before they are functional because money generated in an ICO
funds completion of the project.204 This means that the purchaser
assumes the risk of the business failing to properly develop a
functional asset and losing the money invested.205 Even for
functional tokens, there is some level of risk involved if the token
197. Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769, 777-78, 552 S.W.2d 4, 8-9
(1977); Casali v. Schultz, 292 Ark. 602, 605, 732 S.W.2d 836, 837 (1987).
198. See supra Part II.B.
199. Schultz, 261 Ark. at 780, 552 S.W.2d at 10 (quoting State v. Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc.,
485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw. 1971)).
200. Kira Egorova, Crypto Exchanges, Explained, COINTELEGRAPH (July 10, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/F3BA-SP8M].
201. Kayalyse.io, What Are “Airdrops” in Crypto World?, MEDIUM (Feb. 15, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/K557-FQ56].
202. Id.
203. Schultz, 261 Ark. at 780, 552 S.W.2d at 10 (citing Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d
at 109).
204. See BITCOIN MAG., supra note 103.
205. See id.
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does not perform as promised or if something about the network
does not function properly, among other concerns.206 In either
case, the value given by the offeree is subject to the risks of the
enterprise, however large or small those risks may be.
The third prong requires that “the furnishing of the initial
value” be “induced by the offeror’s promises or representations
which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable
benefit of some kind, over and above the initial value, will accrue
to the offeree as a result of the operation of the enterprise.”207
This means that the purchaser of the cryptoasset must have a
reasonable understanding that the benefit he or she receives from
purchasing it is greater than the initial value he or she gave for
it.208 This is always met for sales involving pre-functional tokens
or contractual rights to purchase tokens when completed because
investors would not offer money for an incomplete project if they
did not expect to gain some benefit upon completion.209
This third prong is likely met in situations involving
functional tokens as well. Many tokens are marketed with the
expectation that they can be resold at a profit, particularly when
early round purchasers are given a discount from the final round
price.210 The ability to participate in the network, as tokens allow,
is probably worth more to offerees and offers them some value
above what they gave for the token or they would not have
purchased the tokens in the first place.211
The fourth prong requires that “the offeree does not receive
the right to exercise practical and actual control over the
managerial decision[s] of the enterprise.”212 Certainly, individual
206. See Park, supra note 121.
207. Schultz, 261 Ark. at 780, 552 S.W.2d at 10 (quoting Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485
P.2d at 109).
208. See id. at 782-83, 552 S.W.3d at 11; see also Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d at
110.
209. See Muhammed Kus, A Critical Review of U.S. Securities Laws and the Status
of Initial Coin Offerings: Potential Solutions for Issuers 31 (Dec. 2018) (L.L.M. thesis,
Maurer School of Law, Indiana University) (on file with the Jerome Hall Law Library,
Indiana University).
210. See Cryptonite, How to Profit from Cryptocurrency, HACKERNOON (Apr. 20,
2019), [https://perma.cc/QE6B-2LMG].
211. See Kus, supra note 209, at 27.
212. Schultz, 261 Ark. at 780, 552 S.W.2d at 10 (quoting Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485
P.2d at 109).
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purchasers of cryptoassets have no control over the programming
of the platform or execution of any smart contracts.213 The
platform is created by the company launching the token, and
because the networks are decentralized, once launched, individual
purchasers have no practical ability to modify the arrangement.214
If, for example, the token provides the purchaser with cloud
storage or access to an internet browser with no advertisements,
the token owner has no real control over the service offered;
rather, the token merely gives access to that functionality.215
Under the Schultz test, there is a high probability that most
cryptoassets constitute securities within its broad definition.216 It
would thus be illegal to sell those assets in Arkansas, or to
Arkansas residents, without first registering the securities in
Arkansas or obtaining an exemption from registration under state
law.217 While it is not certain that every cryptoasset will be a
security under Arkansas law, it is also not certain that they would
not be.218 This uncertainty is a problem for entrepreneurs
interested in exploring this technology.219 If crypto entrepreneurs
are looking to set up shop in a certain state, they will choose states
with favorable regulatory regimes, or at the very least, states with
clear regulatory regimes.220 At this time, Arkansas has neither as
its risk capital approach is much more ambiguous and amorphous
than the Howey test used by many other states.221 Regulatory
uncertainty stifles innovation.222 Creating an exemption for fully
functional cryptoassets would provide regulatory certainty and
incentivize crypto businesses to choose Arkansas.

213. See Andrew Young, Crypto Network Fundamentals, MEDIUM (Dec. 19, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/7GXM-HFEL].
214. See id.
215. See id.; see Park, supra note 121.
216. See supra Part II.C.
217. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-42-403 to -404 (2011 & 2019). This excludes
transactions that are preempted under federal law, such as transactions that are registered
under federal law, or those under certain exemptions. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-42-509 (2019).
218. See The Risk Capital Test - List of States, SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES L. CTR,
[https://perma.cc/S3VB-6TEN] (last visited Sept. 16, 2020).
219. See Park, supra note 121.
220. See infra Part III.A.
221. See supra Part II.B.
222. See Jeff, US Regulatory Uncertainty is Stifling Innovation - Fact or Fiction?,
HACKERNOON (Aug. 8, 2019), [https://perma.cc/8T6J-W877].
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Wyoming resolved the risk that such cryptoassets would be
tokens under the Wyoming risk capital test, and provided
regulatory certainty to entrepreneurs, by adopting a formal
exemption from the securities registration requirement.223
Cryptoassets continue to be subject to state anti-fraud laws, but
the uncertainty as to whether it is necessary to find an exemption
from the state registration requirements is resolved.224

D. Arkansas’s Activity Regarding Cryptoassets
1. Arkansas Securities Department No-Action Letters
On July 18, 2018, the Arkansas Securities Department issued
a No-Action Letter to CEX.IO LTD which stated that staff would
not recommend that the Department take an enforcement action
against the company if it did not seek a license under the Arkansas
Uniform Money Services Act (UMSA).225 CEX.IO LTD, a
crypto exchange established in 2013 and available in forty-three
states, “make[s] fiat-to-crypto transactions accessible by offering
card payments and bank transfers to the[ir] clients.”226
On September 5, 2018, the Arkansas Securities Department
also issued a No-Action Letter to Bucket Technologies, Inc.
(Bucket) which stated that staff would not recommend that the
Department take an enforcement action against the company if it
did not obtain a UMSA license.227 Bucket is “a digital piggy bank
platform” that integrates with existing point-of-sale systems at
retail locations to facilitate coinless cash transactions.228 Bucket
uses blockchain software and is free to retailers.229 Upon
customer request, it allows the cashier to press a button that says
223. SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES L. CTR, supra note 218; H.B. 0070, 64th Leg., Budget
Sess. (Wyo. 2018); H.B. 0062, 65th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2019).
224. Wyo. H.B. 0062.
225. CEX.IO LTD, Ark. Sec. Dep’t No-Action Letter No. 18-NA-0006 (July 18,
2018), [https://perma.cc/VW65-YKSG].
226. About Us, CEX.IO, [https://perma.cc/3NGK-YWQ4] (last visited Sept. 16, 2020).
227. Bucket Technologies, Inc., Ark. Sec. Dep’t No-Action Letter No. 18-NA-0003
(Sept. 5, 2018), [https://perma.cc/7LC4-GVKQ].
228. Bucket Technologies, CRUNCHBASE, [https://perma.cc/HT6C-RMAP] (last
visited Sept. 16, 2020).
229. Kim Souza, The Supply Side: Bucket Technologies Ready for Retail by MidJanuary, TALK BUS. & POL. (Jan. 3, 2019), [https://perma.cc/Q379-3Z74].
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“bucket the change” and give a receipt with a QR code that can
be scanned on a phone to access the customer’s account.230 The
customer can then transfer the funds to his or her bank account
once he or she has “bucketed” fifty dollars.231

2. Previous Legislation
As of early 2020, the Arkansas legislature has passed only
one law regarding blockchain technology.232 Act 1061 of 2019,
“An Act Concerning Blockchain Technology; and for Other
Purposes,” amends the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
(UETA) to include records obtained via blockchain
technology.233 This Act says that signatures “secured through
blockchain technology” are “considered to be in electronic form
and an electronic signature.”234 It also says “[a] record or contract
that is secured through blockchain technology” is “considered to
be in electronic form and an electronic record,” and that “[a] smart
contract shall be considered a commercial contract” and “shall not
be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability.”235
This Act has been highly criticized. An American Bar
Association article over the law, titled Another Bad Blockchain
Bill, commented that “[u]nlike a computer program, [Act 1061]
defies logic.”236 This article’s criticism of the Act points out that
claims made about blockchain technology within the Act are
untrue, no actual existing blockchain meets the blockchain
definition in the Act, signatures and records stored on a
blockchain already meet the UETA definitions, and no smart
contract meets the smart contract definition in the Act, among
other deficiencies.237 Andrew Hinkes, a nationally recognized
attorney for cryptocurrency-related legal issues, and one of
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Heather Morton, Blockchain 2019 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATORS (July 23, 2019), [https://perma.cc/DK6P-BPTB].
233. H.B. 1944, 92nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 2532-122 (2019).
234. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-32-122(b).
235. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-32-122(c).
236. William Denny, Another Bad Blockchain Bill, A.B.A. (May 1, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/4FW8-N8UM].
237. Id.
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CoinDesks’s Most Influential People in Blockchain in 2017,238
tweeted “#Arkansas gives its UETA the ‘bad #blockchain
definition’ treatment with A.C.A. § 25-32-122; no existing
system fits the #blockchain definition, and now any contract is
enforceable & valid if it contains a ‘smart contract term’ in
Arkansas!”239

III. A WAY FORWARD - CREATING AN
EXEMPTION FOR FULLY FUNCTIONAL UTILITY
TOKENS
A. Wyoming - A Crypto Leader
Wyoming has been at the forefront of innovation-friendly
legislative efforts in the regulation of cryptoassets. As of 2019,
Wyoming has enacted at least thirteen different laws regarding
cryptoassets, a space where few states have acted.240 It is the only
state with a truly comprehensive pro-crypto legal framework.241
The benefit of adopting a pro-crypto legal framework is that it
encourages technological innovation, which can lead to an influx
of capital, jobs, and revenue.242
Wyoming has been particularly forward-thinking with its
legislation providing exemptions from state securities laws for
certain cryptoassets and the state has been heralded as the
“Delaware of digital asset law.”243 Wyoming was also the first to
legally recognize both uncertificated and certificated blockchain
shares of stock.244 When it comes to considering how Arkansas
might adopt some of the same forward-looking approaches,

238. Andrew Hinkes, NYU STERN, [https://perma.cc/9L8Z-S2TT] (last visited Sept.
30, 2020).
239. Drew Hinkes (@propelforward), TWITTER (Aug. 15, 2019, 9:03 AM),
[https://perma.cc/NTG3-FV2P].
240. Caitlin Long, What Do Wyoming’s 13 New Blockchain Laws Mean?, FORBES
(Mar. 4, 2019), [https://perma.cc/PM9R-6HG5].
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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looking at whether the State’s securities laws should be amended
is a practical starting point.245
The 2018 Wyoming legislation is titled “Open blockchain
tokens-exemptions.”246 It states that “a developer or seller of an
open blockchain token shall not be deemed the issuer of a
security” if the developer “files a notice of intent with the
secretary of state, . . . the token is for a consumptive purpose,”
and the token was not sold to the purchaser as a financial
investment.247 In order for the token to have not been sold as a
financial investment, the following attributes are important: (1)
the token developer or seller must reasonably believe that the
token is sold for a “consumptive purpose;” (2) at the time of sale,
the token must already have a consumptive purpose; (3) the initial
buyer must be prevented from selling the token until it has a
consumptive purpose; or (4) the developer or seller must take
“reasonable precautions” to ensure the token is not purchased as
a financial investment.248 As such, this law creates two categories
of cryptoassets: those that are financial investments (which will
be regulated as securities), and those that are sold for their
consumptive value (which will not be regulated as securities
under the state blue sky laws).249
The Wyoming law protects more than issuers. Persons who
assist in transactions involving crypto are exempt from being
treated as securities brokers or dealers if they “file[] a notice of
intent with the secretary of state,” they have a “reasonable and
good faith belief that [the] token subject to exchange” meets the
utility token exemption requirements, and they take “reasonably
prompt action to terminate” a token exchange that does not meet
these requirements.250
Wyoming’s pro-crypto regulatory regime has had a
noticeable effect. Dozens of limited liability companies (LLCs)
have already registered in Wyoming with “blockchain” or
245. See, e.g., Errol Villorente, California Bill Seeks to Amend Securities Law to
Exempt Some Cryptocurrencies, MICKY (May. 13, 2020), [https://perma.cc/9EPW-FMCH].
246. H.B. 0070, 64th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2018).
247. Wyo. H.B. 0070(a).
248. Wyo. H.B. 0070.
249. See Wyo. H.B. 0070.
250. Wyo. H.B. 0070.
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“crypto” in their names.251 Similar action in Arkansas is likely to
yield similar results.

B. A Survey of Legislative Activity in Other States
Exempting Utility Tokens
Montana exempted utility tokens from its state securities
laws in May 2019.252 Montana defines a utility token as a digital
unit created “in response to the verification or collection of a
specified number of transactions relating to a digital ledger or
database; . . . by deploying computer code to a blockchain
network that allows for the creation of digital tokens or other
units;” or some combination of those methods.253 It must be:
recorded in a digital ledger or database that is chronological,
consensus-based, decentralized, and mathematically verified in
nature, especially relating to the supply of units and their
distribution; . . . capable of being exchanged or transferred
between persons without an intermediary or custodian; and . . .
issued to allow the holder of the digital unit access to a good or
service delivered by the issuer without vesting the holder with any
ownership interest or equity interest in the issuer.254
A token is exempt from registration if it meets the following
requirements: the token’s purpose is primarily consumptive; the
issuer markets the token for a consumptive purpose and not a
“speculative or investment purpose; . . . the issuer files a notice of
intent . . . with the securities commissioner;” and the “utility
token is available at the time of sale,” or certain other conditions
are met.255 A “consumptive purpose” requires that the purpose of
the token is “to provide or receive goods, services, or content
including access to goods, services, or content.”256
251. Gregory Barber, The Newest Haven for Cryptocurrency Companies? Wyoming,
WIRED (June 13, 2019), [https://perma.cc/2VZW-TFEB].
252. Jeremy Wall, Montana: Utility Tokens Are Not Securities, Joins Colorado And
Wyoming Crypto Friendly States, INV. IN BLOCKCHAIN (May 25, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/243K-4SPY].
253. H.B. 584, 66th Leg., 2019 Sess. (Mont. 2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10105(23)(c)(ii)(A) (2019).
254. Mont. H.B. 584 § 1(23)(c)(ii)(B-D); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10105(23)(c)(ii)(B-D).
255. Mont. H.B. 584 § 1(23)(a); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-105(23)(a).
256. Mont. H.B. 584 § 1(23)(c)(i); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-105(23)(c)(i).
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If a functional token is not available at the time of sale, the
following conditions must be met: “the consumptive purpose of
the . . . token is available within 180 days after . . . sale or transfer;
. . . the initial buyer is prohibited from reselling or transferring the
. . . token until the consumptive purpose . . . is available;” and
“the initial buyer provides a knowing and clear acknowledgment
that the initial buyer is purchasing the . . . token with the primary
intent to use the . . . token for a consumptive purpose and not for
a speculative or investment purpose.”257
There are some clear similarities between the Wyoming and
Montana exemptions, primarily in classifying the exempt tokens
by their consumptive purpose. Both the Wyoming exemption and
the Montana exemption prevent the initial buyer from reselling or
transferring the token until the consumptive purpose is available
unless certain conditions are met.258
Colorado has also adopted similar legislation.
The
“Colorado Digital Token Act” justifies the exemption for utility
tokens due to the “costs and complexities of state securities
registration” that “can outweigh the benefits” for cryptobusinesses, the regulatory uncertainties facing crypto businesses
under Colorado’s securities laws, and to promote the formation
and growth of local companies and jobs.259 The exemption
requires that the issuer “file[] a notice of intent with the securities
commissioner,” the primary purpose of the token be consumptive,
the token issuer markets it for a consumptive purpose rather than
for a “speculative or investment purpose,” and “the consumptive
purpose of the . . . token is available at the time of sale,” or certain
conditions must be met.260 If the consumptive purpose is not
available at the time of sale, it must be available within 180 days
of sale or transfer, the initial buyer cannot transfer or resell the
token until the consumptive purpose is available, and the initial
buyer must provide “a knowing and clear acknowledgment” that
he or she is purchasing the token “with the primary intent to use
257. Mont. H.B. 584 § 1(23)(a)(iv); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-105(23)(a)(iv).
258. Compare Mont. H.B. 584 § 1(23)(a)(iv) and MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10105(23)(a)(iv) (2019) with H.B. 0070 § 1(a)(iii)(B), 64th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2018).
259. S.B. 19-023 § 1(2)(b-c) (Colo. 2019) (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51308.7 (2019)).
260. Colo. S.B. 19-023 § 1(c)(3).
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the . . . token for a consumptive purpose and not a speculative or
investment purpose.”261
Arizona’s legislation exempted certain “[v]irtual coin
offering[s]” from state securities laws, defining “virtual coin” as
“a digital representation of value that can be digitally traded and
that functions as a medium of exchange, unit of account and store
of value.”262 The exemption does not apply to coins marketed as
an investment or coins that do not grant the coin purchaser “the
right to use, contribute to the development of or license the use of
a platform using blockchain technology . . . including a license to
use a product or service on the platform or a discount against fees
for use of the platform” within ninety days of receiving the
coin.263

C. An Arkansas Exemption
The Arkansas legislature should adopt an exemption akin to
those adopted in Wyoming, Montana, and Colorado. The
Montana and Colorado legislatures use a narrower definition of a
security than Arkansas and yet those states found it necessary to
create an exemption for utility tokens.264 If states that use a
narrower definition of an investment contract than Arkansas

261. Colo. S.B. 19-023 § 1(c)(3)(V).
262. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1801(31), -1844(G) (2018).
263. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1801(32)(b).
264. “In a recent conversation with Montana State Auditor Matt Rosendale and Deputy
Securities Commissioner Lynne Egan, both echoed the Howey test as the standard the state
would use to determine whether a virtual currency would fall under the scrutiny of Montana
securities laws.” Jerrod Bevan & Crowley Fleck, How Much Do Lawyers Need to Know
About Bitcoin?, MONT. LAW., Apr. 2018, at 12, 15.
[I]n the Colorado state courts, unlike the Tenth Circuit, the test for an
investment contract may be more demanding. The element of ‘common
enterprise’ may be more difficult to satisfy because it may require: (1) more
than the involvement of a third party; and (2) a benefit derived from the
involvement not only of a third party, but other investors as well. . . . [T]he
Colorado Securities Act parallels the federal securities acts and the state courts
follow the federal circuits in the interpretation of the language of the state and
federal acts.
S. Scott Lasher & Eric B. Liebman, The Application of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. in Colorado
and Other Jurisdictions, COLO. LAW., June 2002, at 73, 77 (emphasis added).
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found it necessary to exempt utility tokens, it is certainly
necessary in Arkansas, which uses the broad risk capital test.265
This Comment suggests that Arkansas should exempt fully
functional cryptoassets, rather than simply “utility tokens.” As
mentioned previously, utility tokens that are not fully functional
may, and probably do, constitute securities, even under the Howey
test, and simply labeling something a “utility token” does not
mean it is not also a security.266 Arkansas courts look at the
“economic reality” of an arrangement rather than labels to
determine if the securities laws apply, and would do so in the
crypto context as well.267 Including functionality as a requisite
for exemption provides greater certainty as to which tokens are
exempt and greater protection for consumers as pre-functional
tokens typically are sold based on speculative future increases in
value.268 “Crypoassets” is a term intended to be broader than the
term “utility tokens,” as used in the other exemptions, thereby
providing exemptions for a greater number of crypto
companies.269
Arkansas is poised to become a more business-friendly state,
and creating this exemption is consistent with the policy goals of
the state in 2020.270 In 2019, Arkansas Governor Asa Hutchinson
created the Arkansas Innovation Council to develop and expand
Arkansas’s “technology-driven economy.”271 Arkansas was the
first state to pass a comprehensive law requiring public and
charter high schools to offer computer science classes.272 There
was a 160.3% increase in Arkansas students receiving computer

265. Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769, 780, 552 S.W.2d 4, 10
(citing State v. Haw. Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw. 1971)).
266. “ICOs, or more specifically tokens, can be called a variety of names, but merely
calling a token a ‘utility’ token or structuring it to provide some utility does not prevent the
token from being a security.” SEC, supra note 114; see also supra Part I (F)-(G).
267. See Casali v. Schultz, 292 Ark. 602, 605-06, 732 S.W.2d 836, 838 (1987).
268. See BATIZ-BENET ET AL., supra note 116, at 11.
269. See supra text accompanying note 3.
270. Governor Announces Arkansas Innovation Council to Expand State’s
Knowledge-Based Economy, TALK BUS. & POL. (Feb. 12, 2019), [https://perma.cc/J3WLFXZN].
271. Id.
272. Issie Lapowsky, So, Arkansas Is Leading the Learn to Code Movement, WIRED
(Mar. 28, 2015), [https://perma.cc/NP8T-D374].
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science degrees from 2014 to 2018.273 Arkansas is also ranked
third for the lowest cost of doing business.274
Arkansas has the potential to become a technology hub and
lawmakers are taking action to attract tech companies and grow
tech talent within the state.275 Creating an innovation-friendly
environment for crypto companies is consistent with the positive
changes that are already taking place. States that have exempted
utility tokens have already seen the positive results, as they have
increased their ability to attract crypto businesses to their state.276
In a state committed to developing tech talent, legislation that will
attract blockchain businesses should be a priority.

CONCLUSION
Arkansas has a lot of work to do to move up the list from
being the forty-fourth best state for technology and innovation
with a grade of “F,” but exempting fully functional cryptoassets
from Arkansas securities laws is a small yet significant step
towards doing so. This is a step towards transforming Arkansas
into a crypto-friendly state and a necessary change for creating a
comprehensive, innovation-forward regulatory framework for
cryptoassets. The tides are already turning as other states are
adopting similar legislation, and Arkansas should act while it is
still early enough to retain the benefits of being a leader in this
space.

273. Tech Industry Report, ARK. INC. 5, [https://perma.cc/8RB5-7ZFK] (last visited
Sept. 17, 2020).
274. Id. at 17.
275. TALK BUS. & POL., supra note 270.
276. Barber, supra note 251.

